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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The present thesis focuses on changes in the person's
self concept. Thus it will be useful to define this term at
the outset. As used here the term self concept refers to a
set of abstractions which the person constructs about him/
herself as an object. Such abstractions are based on past
experience and function to allow the person to represent
past experience, interpret new experience, plan and organize
future behavior, and present him/herself to others. To lo-
cate the present analysis in terms of past analyses of the
self concept it will be useful to refer to four distinctions
suggested by Gordon and Gergen (1968): the self as fact vs.
construct; the self as subject vs. object; the self as struc-
ture vs. process; and the self as single vs. multiple.
The distinction between the self as fact vs . construct
is made necessary because many analyses of the self concept
suggest that it is some physical entity. Here the self con-
cept is viewed as an abstract construction of the person
with no tangible physical properties.
The distinction between the self as subject vs . object
dates back at least to James (1910), and has more recently
been emphasized by Allport (1955) and Epstein (1973). The
self concept may refer to the object of knowledge and experi-
ence or to the organizer and initiator of experience. The
focus here is upon the self concept as the object of know-
ledge.
The present analysis deals with the process rather than
the structure of the self concept. Rather than focus on the
way in which many possible self concepts are organized into
structures, the present focus is on the processes by which
changes are affected in discrete aspects of the self concept.
Finally, the present analysis deals with but a single
dimension of the person's self concept. It is assumed that
the person has many concepts of him/herself; however, for
purposes of achieving clarity, the present analysis deals
with changes in a single dimension of the person's self con-
cept. Future analyses must assess the generality of the pre-
sent analysis in the context of the many concepts that peo-
ple have of themselves.
In general, the present approach is to develop a sim-
plified model of changes in limited aspects of the person's
self concept. As Wylie (1968, 1974) has cogently argued,
past attempts to speculate on a grand scale about the self
concept have usually led to a morass of uninterpretable re-
search and/or unverified clinical speculation, whereas the
study of "lower-order constructs" has led to more productive
research. Once a reliable base of observation has been es-
tablished it becomes possible to gradually assimilate fur-
ther complexities.
3Definition of the Self Concept
One operational definition of the person's self concept
involves simply asking subjects the question: "Who are you?"
and having them respond in an open-ended format. Gordon
(1968) reported a series of studies where subjects responded
with 20 answers to the above question. Subjects' responses
were classified as either categorical or attributive. Cate-
gorical self concepts refer to those responses where subjects
define themselves in terms of membership (or non-member shj p
)
in various social groups (e.g. Catholic, male, member of the
track team, etc.). Attributive self concepts refer to re-
sponses where subjects define themselves in terms of where
they stand, relative to some implicit or explicit reference
group, on various dimensions (e.g. friendly, honest, athle-
tic, intelligent, etc.). Most responses to the "Who am I?"
question are attributive; and, furthermore, categorical self
concepts often derive much of their importance from the at-
tributive implications of membership in a particular group
(Gordon, 1968). The present thesis deals only with attribu-
tive self concepts. This follows from the need to maintain
simplicity and from the fact that past research has dealt
almost exclusively with attributive self concepts (cf.
Jones, Sensenig, and Haley, 1974).
The person's self rating on a given attribute refers to
an estimate of his/her average standing relative to others
on that attribute. In "computing" such an average it is as-
sumed that the person compares the frequency and degree to
which s/he exhibits behavior that is related to the attri-
bute in question with the frequency and degree to which
others exhibit similar behavior. In most studies subjects
are free to specify which "others" they will compare them-
selves to (e.g. Gordon, 1968), while other studies have sub-
jects compare themselves with a common group of "others"
(e.g. O'Brien, 1971, had subjects compare themselves to
"other college freshmen").
The person "knows" where s/he stands on a given attri-
bute because of past experience. The types of experience
which determine the person's self rating include: feedback
from others, performance on objective tests, social compari-
son processes, and subjective judgments. Much of Festinger'
(1954) analysis of social comparison processes can readily
be extrapolated to deal with the person's evaluation of the
attributes which comprise part of his/her self concept
(Bowerman, 1971; Pettigrew, 1967).
Changes in Self Concepts
With the above considerations in mind it is now possi-
ble to discuss changes in the person's self concept. Such
changes result from success and failure experiences which
will be defined and discussed below.
The person's self concept allows him/her to anticipate
future experience. That is, by remembering past events the
person comes to anticipate what will happen in the future
(Kelly, 1955). Success and failure in the present analysis
refer to cases where the person's actual performance rela-
tive to an attribute of his/her self concept deviates mark-
edly from the person's expected performance. Expected per-
formance refers to some range of possible outcomes which the
person would interpret as being consistent with his/her aver-
age self concept on some dimension.
Faced with a discrepancy between expected and actual
performance, the person must explain the causes of his/her
performance. Many possible attributions are possible for
this discrepancy. On the one hand the person may explain
the discrepancy by concluding that s/he is either higher or
lower than s/he had previously thought on the attribute in
question. On the other hand many attributions are available
which do not imply that the person should change his/her
self concept. For example, if the discrepancy involves per-
formance on a test, the person can attribute the discrepancy
between expected and actual performance to transient emo-
tional states (Averill, in press); luck (Rotter, Chance, and
Phares, 1972; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosen-
1
baum, 1972); characteristics of the test (O'Brien, 1971);
characteristics of the person administering the test (Stein-
er, 1968); or the conditions under which the test was admi-
nistered (Bowerman, 1971). All of these possibilities were
suggested in Heider's (1958) seminal analysis. All of these
latter attributions imply that the person will not change his
her self concept. Thus failure on a test will not lead to
self concept change if the person was emotionally upset dur-
ing the test, if the test was a poor one, if the test scorer
was incompetent, or if distracting conditions existed during
the test.
The present model distinguishes only between two types
of attributions for a discrepancy between expected and actual
performance: a) an internal attribution to one's standing
on a particular attribute; and b) attributions which are
either external to the person or which involve transient
emotional states. Attribution to this second set of causes
does not lead to any changes in the person's self concept.
(For convenience of reference this latter set of attribu-
tions will be referred to as "external" attributions.) Thus
the present model assumes a clear isomorphism between self
concept change and the attribution of responsibility. A
close link is also proposed between self concept change, at-
tribution for success and failure, and emotion. To the ex-
tent that the person internalizes responsibility for suc-
cess (thus raising his/her self concept), s/he will report
feelings of elation and calmness; and, to the extent that
the person accepts responsibility for failure (thus lowering
his/her self concept), s/he will report feelings of depres-
sion and anxiety.
A final link to be mentioned here suggests that the
amount of self concept change following success and failure
is related to the amount of and the quality of the informa-
tion that the person has about his/her standing on a given
attribute. Presumably, people with much reliable informa-
tion about their standing on a given attribute will change
their self concepts following success and failure to a lesser
extent than people who have little or no reliable information
about their standing. Rotter (1954) reported experimental
evidence which is consistent with the above hypothesis.
Subjects with little experience on a level of aspiration
(LOA) task showed greater changes in their LOA following the
presentation of feedback that was highly discrepant from
their past performance than did subjects who had had a great
deal of prior experience.
The present thesis includes correlational tests of the
above-noted links between self concept change, attributions
for success and failure, mood, and prior information about
one's self concept.
Situational Determinants of Response tc Success and Failure
The evidence to be summarized below suggests that a
general bias exists in responses to success and failure such
that subjects are more likely to accept (i.e. internalize
responsibility for and change their self concepts according-
ly) success than failure feedback. An important limit to
this tendency concerns situations where subjects expect to
undergo further public evaluation. In such situations it is
hypothesized that subjects are more likely to accept the im-
8Plications of failure than success feedback. Another issue
considered below concerns whether subjects' responses to
feedback in situations where they expect further public •
evaluation are best explained in terms of self concept
change or in terms of changes in strategic self presenta-
tion.
The self-enhancement hypothesis. The self
-enhancement
hypothesis suggests that responses to success and failure
are in part determined by the hedonic value of these two
outcomes. If the person's reaction to success and failure
depended only on an objective analysis of the feedback "data'-
s/he would be as affected by failure as by success feedback.
The self-enhancement hypothesis, however, suggests that peo-
ple are guick to seize upon successes, and egually quick to
explain away failures. To the extent that people exhibit
such a bias, their self concepts will be somewhat more posi-
tive than the concepts that others hold toward them. Ber-
trand Russell provided an excellent (if somewhat overstated)
example of the self-enhancement process:
I am, we will say, a playwright; to every un-
biased person it must be obvious that I am the
most brilliant playwright of the age. Neverthe-
less, for some reason, my plays are seldom per-
formed
,
and when they are
,
they are not successful
.
What is the explanation for this strange state of
affairs? Obviously, that managers , actors , and
critics have combined against me for one reason or
another. The reason, of course , is highly credit-
able to myself : I have refu sed to kowtow to the
great ones of the theatrical world , I have not
flattered the critics, my plays contain home
truths which are unbearable to those whom they hit.
And so my transcendent merit languishes unrecoq-
• nized (quoted in Heider, 1958, p. 171).
Empirical support for the self-enhancement hypothesis
can be found in social comparison and attribution studies,
and these will be discussed below. Several other theories
assume the existence of a self-enhancement motive but have
yet to demonstrate clear empirical support for such a mo-
tive: level of aspiration theory (Lewin et al
. ,
1944; Dig-
gory, 1966), cognitive dissonance theory (Rosenberg, 1968;
Smith, 1968), and self theory (Epstein, 1973; Sullivan*
1954). These theories will not be elaborated here.
Festinger's social comparison theory (1954) began with
the assumption that people are motivated toward self-enhance-
ment. Empirical support for this assumption has been re-
ported by Wheeler, Shaver, Jones, Goethals, Cooper, Robin-
son, Gruder, and Butzine (19 69), and by Wilson and Benner
(1971). Social comparison research commonly employs an
experimental situation where the subject receives a minimal
amount of information about a group of other subjects and is
then asked to choose which of these others s/he wants to
learn more about. Thus subjects might take a test and re-
ceive feedback about their own raw score and rank within a
particular reference group. Subjects then are given a chance
to learn the score of another member of the group. The de-
pendent variable in such studies is the subject's reference
choice.
10
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In suPPort of the self-enhancement hypothesis, Wheeler
et al
.
(1969) found that subjects who expected to actually
interact with their referent chose referents with less abi-
lity than did subjects who did not expect such interaction.
Similarly, Wilson and Benner (1971) found that subjects who
expected to publicly compete with their referent chose refer-
ents with less ability than did subjects who did not expect
such competition. Subjects, then, tend to avoid face-to-
face social comparisons with better-off others, especially
where competition is involved; but yet engage in "wish ful-
filling" comparisons with better-off others when the refer-
ent poses no threat to the subject's self-esteem.
Within an attribution theory framework, Bowerman (19 71)
has argued that people tend to internalize responsibility for
successes and externalize responsibility for failures—thus
enhancing their self concepts. Several studies have found
evidence consistent with such an hypothesis (Eagly, 1967;
O'Brien, 1971; Steiner, 1968). Each of these studies held
constant the size of the discrepancy between subjects' ex-
pected and actual (i.e. manipulated) performance while vary-
ing the valence of the feedback. The dependent variables
employed in these studies were not explicitly attributional
,
but are conceptually related to attributional measures.
Eagly (1967) gave half of her male subjects feedback
which was better and gave the other half feedback which was
worse than their initial self rating of assertiveness . After
11
receiving the feedback, subjects rated their perceptions of
its accuracy, and success feedback was rated as more accur-
ate than failure feedback. In a similar study, subjects es-
timated how well they would perform on a vocabulary test
(O'Brien, 1971). Subjects then took the test, received feed-
back which was either better or worse than they expected,
and evaluated the accuracy and validity of the test. It was
found that subjects in the success condition evaluated the
test as being more accurate and valid than did subjects in
the failure condition.
Steiner (1968) presented subjects with feedback which
purportedly reflected their scores on a personality test.
Half of the subjects received success and half received
failure feedback after which they rated the accuracy of the
personality tests and the competency of the person who had
scored them. Subjects in the success condition rated the
test interpreter as being more competent than did subjects
in the failure condition. No difference, however, was found
between the experimental groups in their ratings of the ac-
curacy of the personality tests.
Several other similar studies have manipulated valence
of feedback without taking into account subjects' initial
performance expectancies and have also obtained support for
the "internalize the good—externalize the bad" hypothesis
(Beckman, 1970; Fitch, 1970; Streufert and Streufert, 1969;
and Wortman, Costanzo, and Witt, 1973). These studies must
12
be interpreted with caution, however, since the failure to
control for initial performance expectancies means that the
results might be attributable to the fact that subjects' ex-
pectancies were simply less discrepant from the success
feedback than from the failure feedback, as has been argued
by Bern (1972, pp. 40-42). New information which is highly
discrepant from past information that the person has about
him/herself tends to be rejected (i.e. responsibility is ex-
ternalized)
.
The self-enhancement hypothesis led to the following
predictions in the present study: a) subjects will change
their self concepts more toward success than toward failure
feedback; b) subjects will tend to attribute success to in-
ternal factors and failure to external factors; c) subjects
will evaluate the source of feedback more favorably follow-
ing success than failure.
An important case where the above hypotheses should not
hold is discussed below.
Expectancy of further public evaluation. Two studies
suggest an important qualification to the self-enhancement
hypothesis—in situations that are relatively public and/or
that involve having subjects expect to be evaluated in the
near future, subjects tend to respond to feedback in a self-
effacing rather than a self-enhancing manner (Eagly and Ack-
sen, 1971; Feather and Simon, 1971).
Feather and Simon (1971) measured subjects' attributions
13
for their performance on a test after half of them had fail-
ed and half had succeeded (feedback was manipulated so that
the discrepancy between initial self concept and the feed-
back was held constant). It was found, unexpectedly, that
subjects tended to attribute their own successes to external
factors and their own failures to internal factors, whereas
they tended to attribute the successes of others to internal
factors and the failures of others to external factors.
These data were explained post hoc by reference to the fact
that the situation was a very public one and subjects may
have felt that their self-evaluative (and other-evaluative)
behavior was itself being monitored. Subjects' self-effac-
ing responses may, therefore, have been due to their desire
to avoid the appearance of immodesty or unfairness.
The Eagly and Acksen (1971) study dealt with self con-
cept change following success and failure (again, the dis-
crepancy between initial self concept and the feedback was
held constant). A second factor in the design placed half
of the subjects in the "expectancy of further public evalu-
ation" condition where subjects expected that as soon as
they had filled out the post-feedback questionnaire they
would be tested again. The other half of the subjects were
not informed of the future testing. Subjects who expected
to be tested again changed their self concepts more toward
failure than toward success feedback, whereas subjects who
did not expect to be tested again changed their self concepts
14
more toward success than toward failure feedback. Eagly and
Acksen argued that the self-effacing responses observed in
the expectancy of further evaluation conditions were due to
the negative social sanctions that occur when people over-
estimate their ability, but not when they underestimate
their ability. A similar analysis was offered by Wortman
et al. (1973) who found that subjects who expected public
evaluation reported having less of the ability in question
than did subjects who did not expect such evaluation.
The present study attempts to replicate the Eagly and
Acksen (1971) study by manipulating the valence of feedback
and the expectancy of further public evaluation while obser-
ving subjects' attributions, and self concept changes fol-
lowing feedback.
Self presentation vs . self concept change . A plausible
interpretation of the Eagly and Acksen and the Feather and
Simon studies is that subjects' self-effacing responses to
feedback may have reflected their strategic self presenta-
tions rather than actual self concept change. A useful pa-
rallel to the self concept vs. self presentation distinction
can be found in the social learning theory distinction be-
tween performance and learning (Bandura, 1965, 1969; Mischel,
1968). Bandura (1965) demonstrated that subjects' perform-
ances may differ from their enduring performance capabilities
(learning), depending on the reinforcement contingencies op-
erating in the situation. Similarly, the person's self con-
15
cept is presumed to be an enduring characteristic of the
person, whereas the person's self presentation is presumed
to be more a function of the perceived reinforcement contin-
gencies operating in the situation.
It is argued here that the effects reported by Eagly
and Acksen and by Feather and Simon involved changes in sub-
jects' self presentations rather than changes in their self
concepts. To support this argument the present study will,
first of all, replicate the Eagly and Acksen (1971) study.
The expectancy of further public evaluation will then be
taken away and subjects will fill out another questionnaire
where they will again rate their self concepts. It is pre-
dicted that subjects who expect further public evaluation
will react to feedback in a self-effacing manner, relative
to subjects who do not expect such evaluation, "but that when
the expectancy of further evaluation is removed, no differ-
ences will be found in the self concept ratings of these two
groups. Such chameleon-like changes in self rating would
suggest that subjects' self presentations are more at issue
than their enduring self concepts.
Trait Determinants of Response to Success and Failure
Self-esteem . Several studies suggest that the self-
evaluative behaviors of subjects at different levels of self-
esteem may be quite different (Eagly, 1967; Fitch, 1973;
Stroebe, Stroebe, and Eagly, 1974). These studies suggest
that high self-esteem subjects react to feedback in more of
16
a self-enhancing manner than low self-esteem subjects.
Stroebe et al. (1974) told high and low self-esteem
subjects that their personalities had been evaluated by an-
other subject. In fact all the evaluations were written by
the experimenters and were either positively or negatively
worded. After receiving the feedback subjects indicated
whether they thought the evaluation was honest or whether it
was due to role-playing instructions which had forced the
evaluator to write an unrealistic evaluation. High self-
esteem subjects more often than low self-esteem subjects in-
dicated that negative evaluations were due to role-playing
instructions and that positive evaluations were honest ones.
Fitch ( 1970) had high and low self-esteem subjects peri-
form a task where they estimated the number of dots presented
tachistoscopically on a screen. Subjects were presented with
success or failure feedback and then indicated their attri-
butions for their performance. Low self-esteem subjects
more often attributed failure to internal factors (ability,
effort) and more often attributed successes to external fac-
tors (task easiness, luck) than did high self-esteem subjects,
although the latter difference was only marginally signifi-
cant .
Both of the above studies are open to an important
methodological criticism. Each study may have confounded
the effects of the size of the discrepancy between self con-
cept and feedback with the effects of the valence (success,
17
failure) of the feedback by their use of standardized suc-
cess and failure feedback. If high self-esteem subjects in
the above studies had higher performance expectancies than
low self-esteem subjects then the differences between these
groups may simply have been due to the fact that success
feedback was less discrepant from the self concepts of high
self-esteem subjects while failure feedback was less discrep-
ant from the self concepts of low self-esteem subjects (this
interpretation will be referred to as the "differential ex-
pectancy" hypothesis). If the self-esteem groups did not
differ in their performance expectancies, this would suggest
that these groups differ more fundamentally in the way they
process new information about themselves, with high self-es-
teem subjects biasing new information in a more self-enhanc-
ing manner than low self-esteem subjects ( this" interpretation
will be referred to as the "differential interpretation" hy-
pothesis). Evidence for the differential interpretation hy-
pothesis was obtained by Eagly (1967) who observed the self
concept changes in high and low self-esteem subjects follow-
ing success and failure feedback. Eagly tailored the feed-
back to hold constant the size of the discrepancy between ex-
pected performance and the feedback. High self-esteem sub-
jects changed their self concepts toward the success and
away from the failure feedback, whereas low self-esteem sub-
jects changed their self concepts toward the failure and
away from the success feedback.
18
The present study attempts to replicate the Eagly (1971)
finding. Additional features of the present study include
the use of a no-feedback control group, and the measurement
of subjects' attributions for their performance and their
evaluations of the test.
The above predictions refer only to the conditions
where subjects do not expect further public evaluation.
Where subjects expect such evaluation no differences are
predicted between the self-esteem groups. This prediction
is based on analyses of situational vs. trait predictors of
behavior (Mischel, 1968; Rotter, 1954). These authors have
argued that in highly structured situations in which few of
the person's responses can meet with reinforcement, indivi-
dual differences are less useful as predictors of behavior
than situational variables. On the other hand, where the
situation is structured such that any response is likely to
be appropriate, situational variables are less useful as pre
dictors than individual differences. In the present experi-
ment it is argued that some situations , more than others,
impose constraints on self-evaluative behavior. Self-evalua
tion that occurs in private without any expectancy of fur-
ther evaluation presents the person with few cues as to ap-
propriate responses, and, therefore, individual difference
variables (e.g. self-esteem) should help to predict beha-
vior. Self-evaluation under the expectancy of further pub-
lic evaluation, it is argued, imposes clear constraints on
19
the range of appropriate responses. Because of the social
norm against immodest self-evaluation, it is predicted that
where further public evaluation is imminent, both high and
low self-esteem subjects should react to feedback in a
self-effacing manner.
Self-monitoring. Recently, Snyder (1974) has developed
a personality scale which purports to assess the degree to
which a person attends to and modifies his/her behavior so
that it is socially acceptable. The end points of this di-
mension are described as follows:
An "ideal type" self-monitor is a person who,
out of a concern for social appropriateness, is
particularly sensitive to the expression and self-
presentation of others
. . . and uses these cues as
guidelines for monitoring and managing his own self-
presentation and expressive behavior." In contrast,
the prototypic non self-monitoring person- has lit-
tle concern for the appropriateness of his presenta-
tion and expression, pays less attention to the ex-
pression of others, and monitors and controls his
presentation to a lesser extent. His presentation
and expression appear to be controlled from within
. . .
rather than by situational and interpersonal
specifications of appropriateness. (Snyder, 1972,-
abstract )
.
In the present study it is predicted that high self-
monitoring subjects will react to feedback in a more self-
effacing manner than low self-monitoring subjects in the ex-
pectancy of further public evaluation conditions, because of
the greater concern on the part of high self-mointoring sub-
jects that their behavior be appropriate. However, the
self-monitoring groups should not differ in the no expect-
20
ancy of further evaluation conditions since in these condi-
tions the question of the appropriateness of self-evaluative
behavior is irrelevant.
.
Once the expectancy of further public evaluation is
removed it is predicted that the differences between the
self-monitoring groups in the expect further public evalua-
tion conditions will disappear since after the expectancy is
removed the issue of appropriateness of self
-evaluative be-
havior is no longer relevant.
21
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Sub jects
Subjects were 300 female undergraduates who received
credits which counted toward their psychology course grades
in return for their participation in the study. The data
from 31 subjects are not presented because they failed to re-
turn for the second session of the experiment. Another 63
subjects are not considered because their initial self con-
cept ratings were either too high (n = 62) or too low (n - 1)
to allow the presentation of the feedback. Twenty-one sub-
jects who were suspicious of the cover story were also eli-
miniated. Thus 185 subjects were included in the analyses
which follow.
Procedure
The experiment involved two one-hour sessions. Subjects
met in groups that ranged in size from 2 to 9.
At the beginning of the first session subjects were
told that they were not to talk with one another during the
experiment and that they were to identify themselves only by
birthdate on all questionnaires. Subjects first filled out
the "Stanford Self-Assessment Inventory" where they indi-
cated, among other things, their standing on the dimension
of clinical and social sensitivity, the amount of informa-
tion on which this rating was based, and the certainty with
sen-
which they had rated their standing. The dimension of
sitivity was chosen as the focal one in the present study
because of its ubiquity in self descriptions (Jones et al
.
,
1974), and because during pre-testing subjects indicated
that their "ideal self" rating on this dimension was higher
than their "real self" rating, t(51) = 12.21, £< .001.
Subjects next filled out the "Personal Reaction Inven-
tory" which contained the self-esteem (Eagly, in press) and
the self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) personality scales.
Subjects at this point read a description of the cover
story and of the procedures to be followed in the experi-
ment. After subjects had finished reading the description,
the experimenter repeated in different words what subjects
had read and then answered any questions. Subjects read and
were told that the experiment was part of a series of stud-
ies concerned with the effects of counseling and testing.
While other studies in this series were said to have focused
on the long term effects of counseling and testing, the pre-
sent study was said to focus on the more immediate reactions
of subjects to taking an ability test and receiving feedback
about their performance. Subjects were told that during the
first session of the experiment they would take a test of
clinical and social sensitivity and that during the second
session they would receive feedback about their performance.
Clinical and social sensitivity was defined as the ability
to understand and to act effectively in complex social situa-
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tions. The test which subjects would take was called the
Stanford Clinical and Social Sensitivity Test (SCSST), and
was said to have been used in several studies around the
country where it had proven to be a "reasonably reliable and
valid test." In fact the test was contrived for use in the
present study.
After answering any questions about the cover story and
the procedures, the experimenter administered the SCSST which
consisted of two five-minute segments of videotape followed
by two questionnaires where subjects rated various aspects of
the tapes (e.g. the anxiety level of the participants, the
level of involvement of the participants, etc.). The first
tape portrayed a therapy session in which a female therapist
interviewed a male alcoholic, and the second tape portrayed
two female friends discussing their jobs. The "actors on the
videotapes were four graduate students.
After completing the SCSST subjects filled out the "Mood
Rating Questionnaire" and wrote a brief description of their
initial reactions to the test. Subjects were then dismissed
from the first session.
At the beginning of the second session subjects read
over one of two written forms which described the procedures
to be followed and which introduced the expectancy of fur-
ther evaluation (all subjects in a given session were assign-
ed to the same expectancy condition). The forms explained
that most subjects would soon receive feedback about their
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performance on the SCSST but that some subjects were in a
control group which would not receive any feedback. The
form went on to explain that as soon as the feedback had
been passed out and subjects had a chance to examine it,
all subjects would fill out a questionnaire.
Expectancy of further public evaluation
. The expect-
ancy manipulation involved varying the time at which sub-
jects learned that they would undergo further public evalua-
tion. Half of the subjects were told about the further eval-
uation at the beginning of the second session while the otner
half were not told until after they had filled out the post-
feedback questionnaire. Thus at the time they filled out
the post-feedback guestionnaire, half of the subjects ex-
pected to undergo further public evaluation and half did not
expect such evaluation. The expectancy of further evalua-
tion was introduced in writing by the following:
At this (that) point you will be tested again .
You will take two of the remaining sections of the
Stanford Clinical and Social Sensitivity Test.
That is, you will watch and rate two more interac-
tion tapes that are part of the . . . test (the
tapes that you observed and rated during the first
session were taken from the short form of the test)
«
After you have completed today's test the ex-
perimenter and another graduate student . . . will
score your tests by hand. In this way you will re-
ceive feedback about how well you have done on to-
day's test very shortly after you have completed
the test. The feedback about your performance on
today's test will be presented verbally to you by
either the experimenter or the other graduate stu-
dent in the small groups that will meet after you
have completed today's test. That is, the present
group . . . will be split into two groups for the
purposes of receiving feedback about today's test.
After you have received feedback about today's testyou will be interviewed (in the small groups) con-cerning your reactions to today's test and to thefeedback that you received.
After "subjects had read the above description the experiment
er repeated the description in slightly different words.
Valence °£ feedback. After subjects had been told of
the procedures to be followed they were presented with feed-
back from the test that they had taken during the first ses-
sion of the experiment (the SCSST)
. Subjects had been ran-
domly assigned to receive success, failure, or no feedback
with about one-third of the subjects assigned to each condi-
tion. The experimenter was blind as to the valence of the
feedback presented to subjects. Each subject in the success
and failure conditions received one of eleven paragraph-long
evaluations. Each evaluation had been rated during pre-
testing by Thurstone's equal intervals technique (Green,
1954) in terms of its implications about the person's clini-
cal and social sensitivity. Subjects in the success and
failure conditions received feedback which was 15 points
higher or 15 points lower, respectively, than their initial
self ratings of sensitivity (which had been made on a 90-
point scale). Samples of each of the computer-written feed-
back messages are presented in Appendix A along with informa
tion about their Thurstone ratings.
Subjects had two minutes to examine their feedback (con
trol subjects received sample feedback forms on which the
feedback message had been blotted out). After examining
their feedback (or sample feedback form) subjects filled out
the "Post-Feedback Form" where they indicated, among other
things, their attributions for their test performance and
their second self rating of clinical and social sensitivity.
As the experimenter passed out the Post-Feedback Form he re-
instituted the expectancy manipulation by reminding subjects
in the "expect further public evaluation" conditions that
they would soon be tested again and receive further feedback
about their sensitivity.
After subjects in the "no expectancy ..." conditions
had completed the Post-Feedback Form they were informed of
the further evaluation and feedback about their sensitivity,
as was noted above.
At this point the experimenter passed out test booklets
and introduced the second half of the clinical and social
sensitivity test. He then began to pl ay the next videotape
which portrayed two clinical psychologist trainees discuss-
ing their supervisor.
Remova l of the expectancy of further public evaluation
.
The videotape had been recorded such that the picture and
sound on the machine began to "act up" after about 30 seconds
of tape. The experimenter, feigning consternation, began to
adjust various nobs on the machine. The machine "broke down"
completely after another 30 seconds had passed (i.e. the
picture and sound were both unintelligible). The experimenter
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acted rather upset that "this stupid machine seems tQ be
acting up again." Subjects were told that the same problera
had come up two weeks Parlor 4-uK e lie and that, apparently, the ma-
chine hadn't been correctly repaired. After appearing at a
loss for a moment about what could be done, the experimenter
announced that: "I gueS s we will just have to ^ Qff ^ .
experiment." Subjects were told to remain seated while
their credit forms were prepared. A few seconds later the
experimenter feigned a sudden burst of insight. That is,
he "remembered" that there were some questionnaires left over
from an earlier experiment and "concluded" that the subjects'
data could be used in that experiment. The experimenter then
retrieved these questionnaires (called the "Post-Experiment
Questionnaire") from an adjoining room and apologized that
parts of the questionnaire would be redundant with others
that subjects had filled out. Subjects were nevertheless
asked to "bear with us" and answer all of the questions on
the questionnaire. Subjects were told that as soon as they
finished the questionnaire the experiment would be completed
and they were to then place all of the forms they had filled
out into a box at the side of the room. The Post-Experiment
Questionnaire included items where subjects rated their
clinical and social sensitivity, their evaluations of the
test, their mood state, and their suspiciousness about the
cover story.
Finally, subjects were debriefed. The experimenter de-
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monstrated that the tape machine was still in working order,
and explained that the Stanford Clinical and Social Sensiti-
vity Test was bogus and that therefore subjects should make
nothing out of the feedback they received. The hypotheses
of the experiment were then explained. To reinforce the de-
briefing message, a videotape segment was presented were one
of the actors in the first set of tapes appeared again and
repeated the debriefing that the experimenter had presented.
Debriefing appeared to be extremely compelling in disabusing
subjects of the deceptions employed in the study. 1
Measuring Instruments
The format of each of the five questionnaires which sub
jects filled out is described below.
1) The Stanford S el f
-Assessment Inventory was composed
of 33 items which asked subjects to rate themselves on 10
different dimensions (e.g. knowledge of chemistry, law; in-
telligence, athletic ability, clinical and social sensitivi-
ty), and to indicate their certainty of and the amount of
information upon which each of the self ratings was based.
The only data reported here concerns subjects' ratings of
their clinical and social sensitivity
. After reading a
paragraph-long definition of clinical and social sensitivity
subjects rated their standing on this dimension on a 90-
point graphic rating scale. Five anchors were included on
the scale: average grade school student (13 points); aver-
age high school student (30 points); average college student
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(55 points); average social caseworker (68 points); average
professional psychiatrist or clinical psychologist (81
points). After rating their average sensitivity subjects
responded to three 9-point bipolar rating scales on which
they indicated: a) the certainty associated with their self
rating of sensitivity; b) the importance of sensitivity; c)
the amount of information they had about their level of sen-
sivity.
2) The Personal Reaction Inventory was a 66-item per-
sonality scale composed of 20 items comprising the self -
esteem scale (Eagly, in press), 25 items comprising the
self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974), and 21 filler items.
Subjects were dichotomized on the basis of their responses
to the self-esteem and the self-monitoring scales. The cor-
relation between these two measures was quite small (r =
-.05, n = 185, n.s.). The internal consistency of the self-
esteem scale was somewhat higher than that of the self-moni-
toring scale (split-half reliabilities were .822 and .479,
respectively)
.
3) The "Mood Rating Form" consisted of fifteen 30-
point graphic rating scales. Only the data from the 7
scales relevant to the hypotheses were analyzed . Six of the
7 scales were combined to yield an overall index of elation-
depression . The end-points of the scales were defined by
the following ad j ective pairs : elated vs. depressed
,
gloomy
vs. cheerful, happy vs. sad, pessimistic vs. optimistic, bad
vs. good, and pleased-with-self vs. displeased-with-self
.
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The internal consistency for this index was quite nigh (co-
efficient alpha = .898). Coefficient alpha values were com-
puted according to the formula discussed by Bohrnstedt
(1972). On the seventh scale subjects rated their calmness
vs. anxiousness ( tne end points of this scale were defined
by two clusters of adjectives: calm, relaxed, at-ease vs.
jittery, nervous, tense).
4) The "Post-Feedback Form" was composed of 5 items,
4 of which will be discussed here. The first item was a 70-
point graphic rating scale where subjects rated their clini-
cal and social sensitivity
. This scale included the same
anchors as described in (1) above except that the numerical
values of each anchor were adjusted to take into account the
fact that the present scale had 70, not 90 points. The rea-
son for not having the present scale be identical to that
used for the first self rating was to minimize the salience
of the fact that subjects were rating themselves again on
the same dimension. The second item was a 40-point graphic
rating scale on which subjects indicated their attribution
for their test performance. The end points of this measure
were defined as: "I was completely responsible—that is:
my ability and motivation were the only factors which contri-
buted to my performance" vs. "Factors which lie outside of
myself were completely responsible—that is: luck, character-
istics of the test, and/or characteristics of the testing sit-
uation were the only factors which contributed to my perform-
ance." The third and fourth items were manipulation checks
where subjects indicated their expectancies concerning the
possibility of further evaluation and their ratings of the
valence of the feedback, respectively. The former rating
was made on a dichotomous scale where subjects indicated
whether they thought they would undergo further evaluation
or whether they were unsure about what to expect during the
remainder of the experiment. The latter rating was made on
a 5-point bi-polar rating scale.
5) The "Post-Experiment Questionnaire" will be de-
scribed in four parts. The first part consisted of six 20-
point graphic rating scales on which subjects evaluated the
test. Only the data from three of these scales were analyzed
as the other three scales were filler items. The three
scales were combined into an index of the positivity vs . ne -
gativity of sub jects ' evaluations of the test . The scales
combined were: confusing vs. straightfoward , valid vs. in-
valid, and unfair vs. fair. The internal consistency of this
index was reasonably high (coefficient alpha - .652).
The second part of the questionnaire was in all but one
respect identical to the questionnaire described in (1)
above, the only difference being that on the present ques-
tionnaire the "average college student" anchor had been re-
moved from the scales where subjects rated their standing on
the various dimensions. These anchors were removed so as to
allow subjects to more easily change their self ratings of
clinical and social sensitivity between the self rating im-
mediately following feedback and the final self rating. it
was felt that the many subjects who rated themselves at or
near this anchor would be unwilling to change their self rat-
ing between these two measurements unless the salience of
such a change was minimized by removing the anchor.
The third part of the questionnaire was identical to
the "Mood Rating Form" described in ( 3 ) above.
The final part of the questionnaire consisted of two
open-ended questions where subjects described their percep-
tions of the purposes of the experiment and any questions or
doubts they had about the cover story. Subjects' responses
to these two items were content analyzed by two independent
judges who were blind to the subjects' experimental condition
Subjects' responses were rated by the judges as: "not at all
suspicious", "somewhat suspicious", or "very suspicious."
Inter-judge reliability was high (r = .83, n = 206, p_<.001);
and, where the two judges disagreed, a third independent
judge determined the suspiciousness rating .
33
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
.
All analyses of variance and covariance were performed
by a multivariate computer program (Finn, 1972). Due to the
slight inequality of cell size (the largest of the six cells
contained 34 subjects, the smallest contained 29 subjects),
tests of effects were computed so as to adjust each effect
for all others at an equal or lower level of design complex-
ity (cf. Chaiken and Well, 1974; Overall and Spiegel, 1969).
Manipul ation Checks
The success of the valence manipulation is suggested by
the significant valence main effect for subjects* ratings of
the valence of the feedback, F( 1,179) = 316,97,. £< .001.
Subjects who received success feedback rated it as being more
positive than did subjects who received failure feedback (Ms
= 1.40, 3.95, respectively, where 1 = feedback was very posi- '
tive and 5 = feedback was very negative). Also, subjects
who received success feedback reported a higher level of cli-
nical and social sensitivity immediately following feedback
than did subjects who received failure feedback, F( 1,178) =
86.42, £< .001; Ms = 57.54, 47.54, respectively, where 0 =
very little sensitivity and 90 = a great deal of sensitivity.
Subjects in the "expectancy of further public evalua-
tion" conditions reported on the "Post-Feedback Form" that
they expected further public evaluation to a greater degree
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than did subjects in the "no expectancy
. . conditions,
£(1,179) = 468.23, p<.001; Ms == 1.03, 1.92, respectively,
where 1 = expect further public evaluation and 2 = do
not know what to expect.
Self-Enhancement and the Expectancy of Further Public Evalua -
tion
Self concept change
. The self-enhancement and the ex-
pectancy of further public evaluation hypotheses, taken to-
gether, led to the prediction of a valence by expectancy in-
teraction on subjects' self ratings of clinical and social
sensitivity immediately following feedback. The inclusion
of no feedback control groups made it possible to answer the
question: "Did subjects in the success conditions change
their self concepts more toward the feedback message than
did subjects in the failure groups?" This answer was ob-
tained by generating the following special contrast: "Suc-
cess -(minus) Control" vs. "Control - Failure". The con-
trast compared the difference between the success and control
groups' self ratings with the difference between the failure
and the control groups' self rating. The contrast weights
(Myers, 19 72; Myers, personal communication) used to compute
this contrast and its interaction with the expectancy inde-
pendent variable are presented in Table 1. A more thorough
discussion of the rationale for the weighted analysis of
variance is presented in Appendix B.
The predicted valence of feedback by expectancy inter-
TABLE 1
Contrast Weights Used for Analysis of Covariance of
Self Concept Ratings Immediately Following Feedback
Valence of feedback
Group
Success Failure Control
Valence main effect
Expect further public evalua-
tion plus the do not expect
further public evaluation
groups
+ 1 + 1 -2
Expectancy main effect
Expect further public evalua-
tion
Do not expect further public
evaluation -1
Valence by expectancy interaction
Expect further public evalua-
tion + 1 + 1 -2
Do not expect further public
evaluation -1 -1 + 2
aThe expectancy main effect was computed by ignoring
(summing across) the valence factor—this is indicated by
the dotted lines.
action for subjects' self ratings of clinical and socxai sen-
sitivity immediately following feedback was marginally signi-
ficant, F(l, 178) = 2.90, £ <. 10 . Neither the valence nor
the expectancy main effects approached significance (F<1 in
both cases). In this analysis subjects' initial self rating
of their sensitivity served as a covariate. Table 2 presents
the means for the valence by expectancy interaction (note
that the means presented correspond to the logic of the con-
trast weights noted in Table 1). As can be seen in Table 2,
the means are in the predicted directions. Single degree of
freedom contrasts (Myers, 1972, pp. 352-356) revealed that
where subjects did not expect further public evaluation they
raised their self concepts more following success than they
lowered their self concepts following failure, F( 1,178) =
3.72, £<.10. Where they expected further public evaluation
subjects lowered their self concepts following failure
slightly more than they raised their self concepts following
success, F(1,178)<1, n.s.
Attributions
. Predictions parallel to those made for
self concept change were made for subjects' attributions for
their test performance—i.e. a valence by expectancy inter-
action was predicted. However, no special weighted contrasts
were employed since no predictions were made concerning the
extent to which the success and failure groups would differ
from the control groups. Thus the design of the analysis was
simply a 2 x 3 factorial. No significant differences were
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TABLE 2
Mean Adjusted Self Ratings of Clinical and
Social Sensitivity Immediately Following Feedback
Valence of feedback
Group
Success-
Control
Control-
Failure
Expectancy
Expect further public
evaluation +3.92 +5.48
Do not expect further
public evaluation +7.81 +2.86
Note. Means are .adjusted for covariance on initial
self rating of clinical and social sensitivity. Positive
numbers refer to self concept change toward the feedback,
adjusted for changes in the control groups.
were obtained for either of the main effects or for the val-
ence by expectancy interaction, F(1,179)<1 in each case.
Evaluation of the test. A third prediction involved
only the self-enhancement hypothesis. It was predicted that
subjects' evaluations of the validity, etc., of the test
would produce a main effect for valence of feedback. No
predictions were made as to the size of the differences be-
tween the success and the failure groups relative to the
control groups, and therefore no special contrasts were em-
ployed. Thus the design of the analysis was a 2 x 3 fac-
torial
.
The analysis of variance revealed the predicted main
effect for valence of feedback, F(2,179) = 10.33, £<.001.
Neither the expectancy main effect nor the valence by ex-
pectancy interaction approached significance, F( 1,179) =
1.57; F(2,179) = 1.06, respectively. Subjects in the suc-
cess condition evaluated the test most positively (M =
20.27), and subjects in the failure condition evaluated the
test most negatively (M = 12.89), with control subjects in-
termediate in their evaluation (M = 19.07). The range of
possible scores on the evaluation index was from -20 (very
negative evaluation) to +40 (very positive evaluation).
Single degree of freedom contrasts revealed significant dif-
ferences between the success and the failure groups, F(l,
179) = 18.08, £<.001; and between the failure and the con-
trol groups, F( 1,179) = 12.29, p < .001; but no significant
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difference between the success and the control groups, F(l,
179X1, n .s. The data suggest, then, that while subjects'
defensively devalued the test following failure there was
no corresponding tendency for them to evaluate the test in
a self-enhancing manner following success.
Other measures. Subjects' responses to three other
questionnaire items yielded unpredicted main effects for the
valence of feedback: subjects' final ratings of the amount
of information they had about their level of clinical and
social sensitivity, their certainty rating for their final
self ratings of sensitivity, and their rating of the amount
of feedback they had received, F(2,178) = 10.77, £<.001;
F(2,178) = 4.96, £<.01; F< 1,179) = 15.39, £<.001, respec-
tively. Neither the expectancy main effect nor the valence
by expectancy interaction approached significance on these
three items. None of these analyses employed special con-
trasts and they were thus of a 2 x 3 factorial design. The
analyses of the amount of information and the certainty items
employed as covariates subjects' initial self ratings of the
amount of information and the certainty with which they rated
their clinical and social sensitivity, respectively. The
analysis of subjects' ratings of the amount of feedback they
had received employed no covariate.
Inspection of T^ble 3 reveals that subjects who received
success feedback were most certain of, and claimed to have
the most information about, their level of clinical ^nd so-
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TABLE 3
Mean Ratings of Certainty and Information Concerning
Final Self Rating of Sensitivity
and of the Amount of Feedback
Valence of feedback
Questionnaire item
Success Failure Control
Certainty3 of final self
rating of sensitivity 6.53 6.06 5.71
Amount of information upon
which final sensitivity 5.54 4.77 4.03
rating is based
Amount of feedback re- 0 „
ceived 2 - 30 1 - 39 b
Note
. The scales ranged from 1 = no certainty, no in-
formation to 9 = much certainty, much information; and 1 =
small amount of feedback to 5 = large amount.
aMean ratings of certainty and information are adjusted
for initial ratings of certainty and information, respective-
ly, that were made at the beginning of the experiment.
Control group subjects did not respond to this item.
cial sensitivity, followed by subjects in the failure group,
and the control groups, respectively. Also, subjects in the
success group claimed to have received more feedback than
did subjects in the failure group.
Single degree of freedom contrasts revealed that sub-
iects in the success group reported having significantly
more information about their level of sensitivity than either
the failure or the control groups, F( 1,178) = 5.77, £<.025;
£< 1,178) = 21.52, £<.00l, respectively; and subjects in the
failure group reported having more information than subjects
in the control group, F( 1,178} = 16.59, £<.001. Single de-
gree of freedom contrasts for the certainty item yielded a
significant difference only for the success vs. control con-
trast, F( 1,178) = 8.05, £<.01, Neither the success vs.
failure nor the failure vs. control contrast was significant,
F( 1, 178) = 2.73, £<.20; F(l,178) = 1.47, £<.25; respec-
tively.
Subjects' mood ratings revealed significant main ef-
fects for valence of feedback on the elation-depression and
the calmness-anxiousness dependent measures, F(2,178) =
10.14, £<.001; F(2,178) = 7.06, £<.005, respectively.
Neither the expectancy main effect nor the valence by ex-
pectancy interaction approached significance on these two
measures. These analyses involved no special contrast
weights and thus the design was a 2 x 3 factorial. Initial
self ratings of elation-depression and calmness-anxiousness
during the first session served as covariates.
Inspection of Table 4 reveals that "success" subjects
were more elated and more calm than "control" subjects, F(l,
178) = 19.62, £ <.001; F< 1,178) = 7.14, 2 <.001, respec-
tively. Success subjects were also more elated and more
calm than failure subjects, F(l,178) = 19.62, p_<.001; F(l,
178) = 9.56, p_<.001, respectively. Finally, control sub-
jects were slightly more elated and slightly less calm than
failure subjects, F(1,178) = 2.00, £<.25; F( 1,178) = 0.14,
n.s., although these differences were not significant.
Self Presentation Versus Self Concept Change
It was predicted that the self-effacing responses of
subjects in the expectancy of further public evaluation con-
ditions would shift toward self-enhancement once this ex-
pectancy was removed. The predicted valence by expectancy
by time (before removal of the expectancy of further evalu-
ation vs. after its removal) interaction was not obtained,
F(1,178)<1, n.s. Neither did the time, valence by time,
or expectancy by time effects approach significance, F(l,
178)<1, n.s.; F(l, 178) = 1.22, n.s.; F(1,178)<1$ n.s.,
respectively. Special (weighted) contrasts were employed in
the above analysis, and subjects' initial self rating of cli-
nical and social sensitivity served as a covariate.
Trait Determinants r£_ Response to Success and Failure
Self-esteem. It was predicted that: (a) when subjects
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TABLE 4
Mean Adjusted Ratings of Two Moods
Uroup
Questionnaire Items
Elation-depression Calmness-Anxiousness
Valence of feedback
Success
Failure
Control
34.51
12.95
19.94
23.32
20.29
20.84
Note. Means are adjusted for covariance on initialself rating of elation-depression and calmness-anxiousness
respectively. The scales ranged from: -90 = vlry depressedto^+90
= very elated; and from 0 = very anxious to 30 - verycalm.
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eem
success
did not expect further public evaluation, high self-est
subjects would change their self concepts
.ore toward
and less toward failure than low self-esteem subjects; and
(b) when subjects expected further public evaluation no such
differences between the self-esteem groups would be obtained.
Thus a valence by expectancy by self-esteem interaction was
predicted for subjects' self ratings of clinical and social
sensitivity immediately following feedback. In this analy-
sis the special contrast weights were again employed (see
Table 1) with the addition that high self-esteem wa s weighted
(+1) and low self-esteem was weighted (-1) a s the third fac-
tor in the design. In this analysis subjects' initial self
rating of sensitivity served as the cov ari a te.
The predicted three-factor interaction was not obtained,
F(1,172)<1, n .s.; nor were the self-esteem main effect or
the self-esteem by expectancy interaction significant, F(l,
172) = 1.84, n.s.; F(1,172)<1, n.s., respectively. Only
the self-esteem by valence interaction approached signifi-
cance, £(1,172) = 3.69, £ <.10. The pattern of means pre-
sented in Table 5 suggests that high self-esteem subjects
changed their self concepts more toward success and less to-
ward failure feedback regardless of the expectancy condition.
Single degree of freedom contrasts revealed marginally signi-
ficant differences between the self-esteem groups at the
"success-control," and the "control-failure" levels of the
valence factor, F(l,172) = 2.38, £<.20; P( 1,172). = 3.55, p_<
TABLE 5
Mean Adjusted Self R atings of Clinical and Social
Sensitivity Immediately Following Feedback
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Group
Self-esteem
High
Low
Valence of feedback
Success-control Control-failure
+ 7.34
+4.17
+2.03
+6.12
sensiffvf
MS
nH
S adjusted for init^l self rating ofti ity a d are averaged over the expectancy factor
feedb^v
nUmbSrS t0 SSlf COnCePt change towarfthe*dback message, adjusted for changes in the control group.
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.10, respectively.
No significant differences involving the self-esteem
factor were observed on subjects' attributions for their
test performance, or on their evaluations of the test.
Self-monitorinq
.
it wa s predicted that when no further
public evaluation was expected, the self-monitoring groups
would not differ in their reactions to feedback, but that
when further evaluation was expected, high self
-monitoring
subjects would be more self-effacing in their reactions to
feedback than low self-monitoring subjects. This analysis
employed special contrast weights and employed subjects' in-
itial self rating of sensitivity as a cov ari a te.
Table 6 presents a summary of the analysis of covariance
for subjects' self ratings of clinical and social sensitivity
immediately following feedback. The predicted three-factor
interaction was not obtained. Ignoring the small magnitude
of this interaction and examining the cell means in Table 7
reveals that where subjects did not expect further public
evaluation, self
-monitoring
, a s predicted, did not help pre-
dict responses to the feedback /Self monitoring main effect,
F(l,172)< 1, n.s.; self-monitoring by valence interaction,
F(1,172)<1, n.s^/. However, where subjects expected further
evaluation, a significant valence by self-monitoring interac-
tion was obtained, F(l,172) = 4.93, p_<.05. While this lat-
ter interaction wa s predicted, the pattern of means is the
opposite of what was predicted. That is, low self-monitoring
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TABLE 6
Summary of Analysis of Cov ari a nce for Self Ratis ngs of
Clinical and Social Sensitivity
Immediately Following Feedback
Source of variance df
Self-monitoring (SM)
SM by valence
SM by expectancy
SM by valence by expectancy
Within cells (error)
1
1
1
1
172
MS
3.27
116.24
*
3.39
60.79
35.59
3.27*
<1
1.71
*£ < . 10
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TABLE 7
Mean Adjusted Self Ratings of Clinical and
Social Sensitivity Immediately Following Feedback
Valence of feedback
Group
.
Success-conctrol Control-failure
Expect further public
evaluation
High self-monitoring
Low self-monitoring
Do not expect further
public evaluation
High self-monitoring
Low self-monitoring
+7.47 +3.05
+0.56 +7.83
+9.06 " " +3.36
+6.41 +2.50
Note
. Means are adjusted for initial self rating of
clinical and social sensitivity. Positive numbers refer to
self concept change in the direction of the feedback mes-
sages, adjusted for changes in the control group.
subjects tended to be more self-effacing th a n high self-
monitoring subjects. This finding, however, must be viewed
with caution because of the small magnitude of the overall
three-factor interaction.
The only other effect approaching significance was the
valence by self-monitoring interaction. Thus high self-moni-
toring subjects generally showed a more self-enhancing re-
sponse to the feedback than low self
-monitoring subjects.
Single degree of freedom contrasts revealed that high self-
monitoring subjects changed their self concepts more toward
success than toward failure feedback, F( 1, 172) = 3.58, p_ <
.10; while low-self-monitoring subjects showed no such ten-
dency, F(l,172)<l,
j
n.s.
No support was obtained for the hypothesis that self-
monitoring would help to predict responses to the removal of
the expectancy of further public evaluation ( F < 1 for self-
monitoring main effect and interactions involving self-moni-
toring)
.
Correlational Tests of Self Concept Model
The present self concept model led to two sets of pre-
dictions. First, correlations were predicted among degree
of self concept change, attributions for test performance,
evaluation of the test, and mood following feedback. Table
8 presents the results of correlational tests of these pre-
dictions. The correlations presented are averages based on
the four conditions in which subjects received feedback, thus
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TABLE 8
Average Within-cell Correlations Among Indices of
Self Concept Change, Attributions,
Test Evaluation, and Mood
Variable
(1) self concept change
—post feedback min-
us initial self
rating
(2) self concept change
—final self rating
minus initial self
rating
(3) evaluation of the
test
(4) attribution for test
performance
(5) elation-depression
(6) calmness-anxiousness
(2) (3) (4)
.19
(5)
53**
.21**
.17 .25**
14 .24 * *
(6)
12
.09
23**
.26**
.05
.06 .48
.46**
Note. Positive correlations suggest support for thehypotheses. Degrees of freedom are 114 for all correlatio
*p < .05 (two-tailed)
**p < .01 (two-tailed)
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the sample consisted of 114 subjects, not 185 B . in earlier
analyses. Averages were computed according to McN«mtr'i
(1955, pp. 148-149) formula. Averaging of these four cells
seamed justified after initial t-tests revealed that in only
4 of 90 comparisons did any two of the combined correlations
differ significantly <£< .05) from one another (on the basis
of chance alone 4.5 significant differences would be expecL-
<•(]).
Inspection of Table 8 reveals that all of the correla-
tions are in the predicted direction, although only the self
concept change, test evaluation, and elation-depression in-
dices are significantly correlated with one another in a con
sistent fashion. When they received success feedback, sub-
jects who raised their self concepts most tended to evaluate
the test in a highly positive manner and reported n highly
elated mood state. Similarly, when they received failure
feedback, subjects who lowered their self concepts to the
greatest degree tended to evaluate the test in a highly po-
sitive manner and report a highly depressed mood state.
The second set of predictions was that subjects with
high levels of certainty or prior information concerning
their initial self rating of clinical and social sensitivity
should show little self concept change following feedback.
Table 9 presents correlational tests of these predictions.
The correlations presented are averages based on the four
cells in which subjects received feedback.
TABLE 9
Average Wthla-c.ll Correlations Between Self concept
Change and Prior Information/Certainty about Self Conoept
Variable
(3) (4)
(1) Self concept change—post feedback
mmuc initial self rating
(2) Self concept change—final self
rating minus initial self rating
(3) Amount of prior information about
self concept
(4) Certainty associated with initial
rating of self concept
-.07
-.04
.01
.03
.66
Note. Positive correlations are consistent with thehypotheses. Degrees of freedom are 114 for all correlations
*£ < .01
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inspection of Table 9 reveals no support for the hypo-
theses, with the rasgnitude of the correlations heing close
to zero.
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CHAPTER iv
DISCUSSION
Self-enh.nr^nt and the Expect.nc, of Further Public Ev^.
g tion
The data generally supported the self
-enhancement hypo-
thesis. Where they did not expect further public evaluation,
subjects tended to a marginally significant degree to change
their self concepts more toward success than toward failure
feedback. Subjects who received success feedback reported
that they had received more feedback, and that they were more
certain of, and had more information about, their level of
clinical and social sensitivity, than subjects who received
failure feedback. Finally, subjects who received success
feedback evaluated the test more positively than subjects who
received failure feedback, although only the failure groups'
evaluations differed significantly from those of the control
groups.
Two interpretations of the latter finding seem plausi-
ble. First, since the control groups' evaluations of the
test were relatively positive, a ceiling effect may have
made it impossible for the success group to evaluate the
test more favorably than the control groups. To test for a
ceiling effect, a homogeneity of variance test was computed.
A ceiling effect would be suggested by lower variances in
the success and control groups. As can be seen in Table 10,
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TABLE 10
Cell V^rianancea for the Test Evaluation Index
Group
Valence of feedback
Expect further public
evaluation
Do not expect further
public evaluation
Success Failure Control
76.37
93.88
115.74
105.80
83.89
90.04
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the variances in the failure groups are higher than those
'
in the success or control groups. However, an F-max test
of homogeneity of variance (Winer, 1971) revealed that this
difference wa s not significant (Fmax = 1.52, n.s.). Also
arguing against a ceiling effect is the f act that the means
in the success and control groups are approximately (+20)
while the range of the scale is from (-20) to ( +40). Thus,
subjects' responses in the success and control groups do
not appear to be limited by a ceiling effect.
A non-artifactual interpretation of the above finding is
that the pre-feedback evaluation of the test has implications
for the ways in which subjects respond to feedback. Where
the test is initially evaluated in a very positive manner it
may be unnecessary for subjects who receive success feedback
to enhance their evaluation of the test, since'it is already
seen as leading to reliable and valid results. Subjects who
fail on such a test, however, m ay have to either devalue the
test, or lower their self concepts. Conversely, when a test
is initially evaluated very negatively, subjects who receive
failure feedback should show no tendency to further devalue
the test, since its results are, from the outset, considered
suspect. Subjects who receive success feedback on such a
test should tend to minimize its negative evaluation so as
to enhance their self concepts. In the present study, then,
the initially positive evaluation of the test (as shown by
its evaluation by the control groups) may have meant that
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subjects in the success conditions could enhance their self
concepts without raising their evaluation of the test where-
as subjects in the failure conditions may have had to devalue
the test as a defense against lowering their self concepts.
This analysis could be tested in future studies by varying
the perceived validity of the test.
The failure of the attribution item to support the self-
enhancement hypothesis may have been due to the ambiguous
wording of this item. Subjects indicated "Who or what w a s
responsible" for their test performance-themselves, or fac-
tors which lay outside of themselves. Recently, Fishbein
and Ajzen (19 73) have argued that many of the contradictory
findings in the attribution theory are a are due to the ambig-
uous wording of attribution measures. Thus an attribution
question like the one above can be interpreted" simply in
terms of an internal vs. external locus of the cause of some
event, or in terms of intentional vs. unintentional behavior
(i.e. subjects may think they are "responsible" only if they
intended for an event to occur). If subjects adopted the lat-
ter interpretation then their attributions would be mislead-
ing, since the present study is not concerned with the attri-
bution of intentionality, but simply with the locus of the
cause of test performance. Future studies in this area should
use more specifically defined items to assess attributions.
For example, Stroebe, Stroebe, and Eagly (19 74) had subjects
pick one of two possible reasons for another person's beh?-
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vior, one of which „a s internal 3nd the other external ^
the other person. Such specificity reduces error of raes -
surement by minimi2ing confusion as to the level of a ttribu-
tion being rated.
The weakness of the support for the expectancy of fur-
ther public evaluation hypothesis may have been due to two
differences between the Eagly and Acksen (1971) and the pre-
sent study. First, in the Eagly and Acksen study, subjects
expected further evaluation in a one-to-one situation where-
as in the present study subjects expected to be tested in
groups. The individualized contact present in the E.gly and
Acksen study m ay have been necessary to produce self-effac-
ing responses to feedback.
Secondly, the weakness of the support for the hypothesis
may have been due to differences in experimenter characteris-
tics in the two studies. It would seem likely that the ex-
pectancy of further public evaluation should exert stronger
effects when the experimenter is cold and/or critical in his/
her interactions with subjects. While there are no data to
confirm such speculation, the experimenter in the present
study may have been less threatening to subjects than the
experimenter in the Eagly and Acksen study, and as such m ay
not have induced as much self-effacing behavior. Future
studies might manipulate experimenter characteristics along
the warm-cold or the critical-accepting dimensions with the
prediction that the Eagly and Acksen findings would be most
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strongly supported when the experimenter was critical and/or
cold in his/her interactions with the subjects.
Self Presentation Versus
, Self Concept Change
The present data failed to support any distinction be-
tween self presentation and self concept change. This fail-
ure may have been due to the fact that subjects felt commit-
ted to the self rating that they made immediately following
feedback and were thus unwilling to make any dramatic shift
in their self-rating after the removal of the expectancy of
further public evaluation. Recent studies in the dissonance/
attitude change area suggest that after having induced an
expectancy in a given situation (e.g. that subjects will
write a counter-attitudinal essay), it is difficult to then
remove the expectancy and obtain the results that would have
been obtained had not the expectancy been introduced at all
(e.g. Goethals and Cooper, in press). In everyday life,
changes in self presentation most often occur in situations
which are widely enough separated so that the audience for
one presentation will not also observe other, inconsistent
presentations (cf. Goffman, 1959. pp. 135-140).
It may be difficult to demonstrate the distinction be-
tween self concept change and changes in self presentation
because of the evaluation apprehension (Rosenberg, 1965,
1969) which may attend inconsistencies in self-eva luative
behavior. The notion that people should have consistent
views of themselves is widely shared (e.g. Gergen, 1971) in
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sp.te of much evidence which calls this notion ^ question
(e.g. Gergen, 19 68, 1971 . Mischel
,
1968)
. ^ ^
unwilling to give evidence of inconsistencies in their self-
evaluative behavior-particularly when such inconsistencies
might appear self-serving. Three ways to rainimi ze such 9P-
prehension seem plausible.
First, self-evaluations might be observed in situations
which are presented as independent of one another. ln the
present study, for example, subjects might have been bold
that the experiment was over after they had filled out the
post-feedback questionnaire. Then, ostensibly having left
the experiment, they might have been induced to participate
in a second (presumably unrelated) experiment, during which
they would again rate their clinical and social sensitivity.
Secondly, the set presented to subjects might suggest
[
that variability in self-evaluative behavior is quite normal.
Third, self-evaluations might be monitored unobtrusively
in at least one of the situations employed in the experiment
(e.g. by content analyses of verbal or written self presen-
tations rather than by questionnaire responses). Naturally
occuring changes in self presentations usually involve ra-
ther subtle variations in the wording of self-evaluations or
in the emphasis placed on various aspects of oneself, with
only a minimal amount of self-consciousness. Such changes
may be inhibited by forcing subjects to rate themselves on
clearly defined rating scales.
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Self-esteem
The present data fit a simpler pattern than was expect-
ed with regard to self-esteem. No support was obtained for
the notion that self-esteem would help predict subjects' re-
sponses to feedback only when they did not expect further
evaluation. Instead, regardless of the expectancy condi-
tion, high self-esteem subjects more often accepted success
and less often accepted failure feedback than low self-esteem
subjects. The present findings are consistent with those of
Eagly (1967), Fitch (1970), and Stroebe, Stroebe, and Eagly
(1974). Interestingly, the magnitude of the valence by
self-esteem interaction was smaller in the two studies (the
present study and Eagly, 1967) where the size of the dis-
crepancy between initial self concept and feedback was held
constant than in the two studies where this discrepancy was
not held constant. Table 11 presents the valence by expect-
ancy interactions obtained in the four studies.
Thus, when defined in absolute terms, success feedback
is often more consistent with the self concepts of high self-
esteem subjects while failure is more consistent with the
self concepts of low self-esteem subjects, and subjects tend
to accept feedback which is consistent with their existing
self concepts more than feedback which is discrepant from
their self concepts. However, even when the size of the
discrepancy between expected and actual performance is held
constant, high self-esteem subjects still react to feedback
TABLE 11
Results of Analyses of Variance for Self-est
Valence of Feedback Interaction in f
eem by
Four Experiments
Experiment
Eagly (1967)
Present study
Fitch (1970)
Stroebe, Stroebe,
and Eagly (1974)
MS df
2.27 1, 32 4. 60 <. 050
131.85 1, 172 3. 69 <• 056
18.02 1, 112 6. 09 <. 025
a 1, 52 11. 00 <• 002
ticle.
This information wa s not presented in the original ar-
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in a more self-enhancing manner than low self-esteem ob-jects. This latter trend may ^ expiained ^ ^ hypoth^is
that the learning history of low self-esteem subjects has
been replete with failures to perfom up fcQ^
=xes whereas high self-esteem subjects have more often m*t
and/or exceeded their expectancies for performance. Such
longitudinal issues require much more study.
The present data did not support the hypothesis that
self-esteem would help predict subjects' responses to feed-
back only in the no expectancy of further evaluation condi-
tions. This failure may stem from mistaken assumptions in
Mischel-s (1968, 1973) analyses of trait vs. situational de-
terminants of behavior. Mischel
' s position has been that a
negative correlation exists between the usefulness of trait
and the usefulness of situational predictors of behavior.
He argued: "To the degree that subjects are exposed to pow-
erful treatments, the role of individual differences
will be minimized. Conversely, when treatments are weak,
ambiguous, or trivial, individual differences should exert
significant effects" (Mischel, 1973, p. 276). In contrast,
the present view suggests a dimension whose end points cor-
respond to those described by Mischel, but which includes a
middle ground in which both trait and situational variables
help to predict behavior. Further, it is argued th*t in
t psychological experiments, situational variables cannot
trict the range of subjects' responses to such a degree
mos
res
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that trait variables cannot predict behavior-few experi-
menters are able to make subjects "an offer they can't re-
fuse'' (The Godfather
,
Puzo, 1969). Recently, Cronbach (1975)
has pointed out the growing tendency toward construction of
complex matrices which combine trait and situational vari-
ables in order to predict behavior. Clearly, it makes lit-
tle sense to think of situational and trait variables as mu-
tually exclusive predictors of behavior—in all but the most
extreme (and usually trivial) cases both traits and situa-
tional variables can help in such predictions.
In the present study it was found that the expectancy of
further public evaluation does not restrict the range of pos-
sible responses to feedback enough to preclude the useful-
ness of the self-esteem trait variable in the prediction of
self-evaluative behavior.
Self
-monitoring
A conservative interpretation of the data suggests,
simply, that the self-monitoring hypotheses were not con-
firmed and that self-monitoring was not related to subjects'
self concept and/or self presentational changes following
feedback. Ignoring the lack of significance of the predicted
three-factor interaction, and examining the simple two-factor
valence by self-monitoring interactions at each level of the
expectancy factor, led to a conclusion which contradicted
the hypotheses. That is, where they expected further evalu-
ation, low self-monitoring subjects were more self-effacing
than high self
-monitoring subjects, whereas the predicted
result was exactly the reverse. In addition, self-monitor-
ing was (contrary to the prediction) not related to subjects-
responses to the removal of the expectancy of further eval-
uation. Interpretation of this latter failure is difficult,
h-wever, because of the fact that the removal of the expect-
ancy itself did not lead to the predicted results. Because
of the plausibility of the relationship between self
-monitor-
ing and self presentational processes, further attempts
should be made to test the present hypotheses.
Correlational Tests of Self Concept Model
The present data partially support the hypothesized
links between self concept change, attributions and mood.
Although the attribution variable was not consistently cor-
related with self concept change or mood, a conceptually re-
lated variable, subjects' evaluations of the test, was sig-
nificantly correlated with these variables. The elation-
depression mood scale was consistently correlated with the
self concept and test evaluation measures while the calmness-
anxiousness scale was not. This finding might suggest that
success and failure experiences more involve the elation-
depression than the calmness-anxiousness dimension except for
the fact that both of these mood scales generated significant
main effects for the valence of feedback factor in the ana-
lysis of variance. An inconsistency exists, then, between
the correlational data and the experimental data concerning
the calmness-anxiousness dimension. An explanation of this
inconsistency might be that this latter scale was a rela-
tively unreliable one, based as it was on a single item
while the elation-depression measure was based on six items.
The support for the present self concept model is limit-
ed by the correlational nature of the data linking self con-
cept change with test evaluation and mood. Futher research
might experimentally manipulate one or more of these vari-
ables while observing the concomitant changes in the others.
For example, subjects' attributions for their test perform-
ance might be manipulated by exposing them to a model who
either internalizes or externalizes responsibility for his/
her performance. Subjects exposed to the "internalizer « mod-
el should change their self concepts to a greater degree fol-
lowing feedback, and should show greater changes in mood
than subjects exposed to the "externalizes" model.
The data did not support the hypothesis that the amount
of prior information and certainty about one's self concept
should be negatively correlated with the degree of self con-
cept change following feedback. This failure may have oc-
curred because subjects in the present study may not have
differed from one another enough in the amount of informa-
tion and/or certainty concerning their initial self ratings
f clinical and social sensitivity. Thus a restricted range
ight explain the failure of the hypothesis. As was noted
earlier, Rotter (1954) reported a study which manipulated the
o
m
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amount of prior Information presented concernlng
performs on a Xeve! of aspiration task
. High amQunts ^
information were associated with small shifts in level of
aspiration following feedback, it may be necessary to ex-
perimentally vary the amount of information which subjects
have about themselves in order to demonstrate the link be-
tween prior information and self concept change. Alterna-
tively, it may be possible to find self concept dimensions
where subjects differ more in the amount of information they
have about themselves than they did in the present study.
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FOOTNOTES
We no problems appeared to exist in disabusing sub-
jects of the deceptions employed in the study, one subject
apparently experienced some distress over her participation
in the study. This subject had been going through a long
period of depression and apparently felt very happy when she
learned that she had done well on the test (i.e. she was in
the success condition). When she found out that the test and
feedback were fake this apparently "burst her bubble" of good
feelings she had had and sent her into an even more depressed
state for at least a couple of days.
This particular incident points out how difficult it is
to do experimental research with self concept phenomena.
Perhaps in the present study some screening procedure could
have been used so as to exclude subjects who were feeling
particularly depressed or who were under emotional stress.
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APPENDIX A
Below are listed the 11 feedback Usages that were pre
sented to subjects in the present study and the Thurstone
values that were established for each during pre-testing.
The Thurstone values refer to ratings made by 51 pre-test
subjects who rated the implications of each of the feedback
messages on a scale where "0" implies that the person refer-
red to in the message is extremely deficient in social sen-
sitivity and "90" implies that the person has an extraordin-
ary amount of sensitivity.
Statement #1 (Thurstone scale value = 80.90).
.
Your Performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity wa s excellent, your score is one
of the highest that has ever been recorded for acollege student. Your responses showed an extreme-ly well developed ability to make sense out of com-plex social interactions. Your perceptions of so-
cial situations were highly sophisticated and realis-tic—much more so than those of many students who
are training to become professional psychotherapists
or psychiatrists.
Statement #2 (Thurstone scale value = 69.71).
Your performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity was very much superior to that
of the average college student. Your responses
showed a highly .developed ability to make sense out
of complex social situations. Your perceptions of
social interactions were generally quite sophisticated
and realistic—much more so than those of most col-
lege students.
Statement #3 (Thurstone scale value = 65.90).
Your performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity was very much above the average
for college undergraduates. Your responses showed
a well developed abili-K/ ™ i
Plex social situation.
Y
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Statement #4 (Thurstone value = 62.88).
Your performance on the fpcf rt -P -i • •
social sensitivity „a s above thfaver-q^forlege undergraduates. Your responses^™ ,2
uie average college undergraduate.
Statement #5 (Thurstone value = 59.75).
Your performance on the test of clinical andsocial sensitivity was slightly above the average
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d™^ates. Your responses showedlightly above average ability (relative to col-lege undergraduates) to make sense out of complexsocial situations. Your perceptions of social in-teractions were occasionally more sophisticated andrealistic than those of the average undergraduate.
Statement #6 (Thurstone value = 54.65).
Your performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity was about average for a college
undergraduate. Your responses showed an average
ability (relative to college undergraduates) to
make sense out of complex social situations. Your
perceptions of .social interactions were about as.
sophisticated and realistic as those of the average
undergraduate.
Statement #7 (Thurstone value = 49.22).
Your performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity was slightly below the average
for college undergraduates. Your responses showed
a slightly below average ability (relative to col-
lege undergraduates) to make sense out of complex
social situations. Your perceptions of social inter-
actions were occasionally less sophisticated and
realistic than those of the average college student.
Statement #8 (Thurstone value =45.43).
Your performance on the test- of r*n~- i
social sensitivity „as below the average for *flege underaraHnatoc v col-
tlons^
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i . Your perceptions of social intertr+f™"less sophisticated and realistic than those of f-Z^average undergraduate. the
Statement #9 (Thurstone value = 38.88).
Your performance on the test of clinical andsocial sensitivity was very much inferior to that
a marLd^lacTor^Vr^; Y°Ur "^seslhowedarked lack of ability to make sense out of comolevsocial situations.
. Your perceptions of soc 1actions were generally quite naive and unrealistic-much more so than those of most college students!
Statement #10 (Thurstone value = 33.57).
_
Your performance on the test of clinical andsocial sensitivity was very much below the averagefor college undergraduates. Your responses showed
a poorly developed ability (relative to college
undergraduates) to make sense out of complex social
situations. Your perceptions of social interactions
were very unsophisticated and unreal! stic—much more
so than those of most college undergraduates.
Statement #11 (Thurstone value = 27.00).
Your performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity was very inadequate. Your score
was among the worst that has so far been recorded
for a college student. Your responses showed a very
poorly developed .ability to make sense out of com-
plex social situations. Your perceptions of social
interactions were very naive and unrealistic—much
more so than those of many high school students.
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Weighted contrasts were employed to assess whether sub-
jects in the success condition raised their self concepts
more than subjects in the failure condition lowered their
self concepts following feedback. The valence main effect
contrast, then, compared the difference in self concept rat-
ings between the success and control groups with the differ-
ence between the failure and control groups. This contrast
can be represented algebraicly as follows (let S = success,
F = failure, and C = control group): /_~(S-C) - (c-F) ~.
Simplifying this expression yields: (S+F-2C). Thus the
contrast weights for the valence main effect were: S = +1,
P = +1, and C = -2. The valence main effect was thus on one
degree of freedom (Myers, 1972; Myers, personal communica-
tion). The expectancy main effect was computed with the "ex-
pect further evaluation" condition weighted +1 and the "do
not expect further evaluation" weighted -1. The valence by
expectancy interaction was computed with cell weights that
were determined by multiplying the "valence" weight with the
"expectancy" weight associated with each cell in the design.
Weighted contrasts were employed only on the self con-
cept dependent variables since only with regard to these va-
riables were predictions made as to the extent to which the
success and failure groups would differ from the control
groups.


